Wild-cards

There was some question about what role the army may end up playing in all of this.  My sense is that there has been a bit of a purge in the revolutionary guards, older, moderate officers have been pushed out and those loyal to Ahmedinejad promoted.  It also seems like the Basij paramilitary has been strengthened, and made a vehicle for patronage by being given valuable franchises (including large construction contracts). Similar to the state of affairs in China, where certain enterprises are run by the army.

The patronage is coupled with something like selective economic warfare.  If you inflate the economy, and then increase salaries for those loyal to you, you will impoverish your opponents and weaken them. Your opponents economic resources are weakened without your having to resort to something as crass as wholesale confiscation of their property.  I’ve begun to think Ahmedinejad may be a lot more cunning than he is given credit for, and I don’t believe Khamenei is entirely in control. The army is a wild card, but some of the moderate forces have led the RG in the past and may still have friends there.

Another wild-card could very easily be the religious establishment.  Their relationship with Khamenei may be less than collegial, apparently there has been some questioning of Khamenei’s religious training.  If a group of influential clerics were to speak in favor of a run-off election, or against the repressive actions of the regime on Friday, that would have a huge impact.

Courage, Merry, courage for our friends

To continue the realpolitik theme, I keep hearing from friends that these protests will die when they are ruthlessly crushed by the military and para-military forces firmly controlled by the Iranian regime through a system of patronage. This risk definitely exists, but the most anyone can do is follow their conscience and do the right thing. This is the first popular movement in a repressive regime to be documented via social networks. That makes a difference, just like the letter-writing campaigns pioneered by the folks at Amnesty International made a difference. We also should not doubt the power of non-violent protest and the moral authority it confers.

There are a few things about this protest that may make it stronger than it appears:

  • The protests are widespread, and have broad support within the country.
  • Civilian supporters of the regime admit the election results are likely inaccurate, even if they want their guy to win.
  • The protesters have major political figures on their side.
  • The religious establishment has yet to make it’s views known and they may not look kindly at the takeover by a militarized regime which will eventually undermine their authority.
  • Despite the Iranian regime’s attempts, news, photos and video continue to stream in documenting the protests and the authoritarian response.

These are all good reasons the movement in Iran may be more successful than the nay-sayers fear. But even if it isn’t, the real question is who stands in the right, and whether we, as bystanders should recognize the abuse of power for what it is.

We must hope for the best, there is no courage to be found in despair, and the people of Iran will need all the courage they can muster to see a restoration of their right to freely elect leaders of their choosing.